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Ethology, the evolutionary science of behaviour, assumes that natural selection shapes behaviour and
its neural substrates in humans and other animals. In this view, the nervous system of any animal
comprises a suite of morphological and behavioural adaptations for solving speciﬁc information
processing problems posed by the physical or social environment. Since the allocation of behaviour
often reﬂects economic optimization of evolutionary ﬁtness subject to physical and cognitive
constraints, neurobiological studies of reward, punishment, motivation and decision making will
proﬁt from an appreciation of the information processing problems confronted by animals in their
natural physical and social environments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The unifying goal of ethology, aswell as the newer ﬁelds
of behavioural ecology and sociobiology, is to provide
evolutionary explanations for behaviour (Hinde 1982;
Krebs & Davies 1993; Trivers 2002). This approach
proposes that the forces of natural and sexual selection
favour behaviours that maximize the reproductive
success of individuals within the context of their native
physical and social environments. Ethologically,
rewards can be considered proximate goals that, when
acquired, tend to enhance survival and mating success
(Hinde 1982). Similarly, avoiding punishment is a
proximate goal that ultimately serves to augment the
long-term likelihood of survival and reproduction.
These assumptions thus extend the traditional psycho-
logical and neurobiological notions of reward and
punishment, which are typically deﬁned by the quality
of eliciting approach and avoidance, respectively
(Skinner 1938; Robbins & Everitt 1996). As detailed
below,theassumptionofevolutionaryadaptationwithin
ethology, behavioural ecology and sociobiology has
promoted the development of mathematical models
that formally deﬁne rewards and punishments within
speciﬁc behavioural contexts. Such models imply that
full understanding of the neurobiology of reward and
decision making will require consideration of naturally
occurringbehavioursinthespeciﬁcecologicalandsocial
contexts in which they are normally expressed.
2. THE ECONOMICS OF FORAGING BEHAVIOUR
One of the most fundamental choices an animal must
confront while foraging is to decide between exploita-
tion and exploration, i.e. whether to consume what is at
hand or to search for better alternatives. Optimal
foraging theory represented an early application of
economic modelling to animal foraging behaviour to
derive the theoretical ‘optimal’ solution to such
dilemmas (see Stephens & Krebs (1986) for a review).
One of the ﬁrst models was developed by MacArthur &
Pianka (1966) who deﬁned the criteria for the
consumption or rejection of prey items associated
with different levels of energetic investment (to hunt or
otherwise procure) and different rates of energetic
return. This ‘prey model’ begins with the premise that
the average rate of energy intake R may be modelled as
the ratio of the energetic beneﬁt afforded to the animal
relative to the time costs of foraging
R Z
E
Th CTs
;
where R is the net beneﬁt gained by the predator for
consuming a particular prey type; E is the amount of
energy gained; Th is the handling time; and Ts is the
search time. The model is solved to maximize R, which
determines the diet offering the greatest net energetic
return and thus maximizing evolutionary success.
One prediction of this model is that the greater the
abundance of higher quality foods, the less an animal’s
diet will consist of lower quality foods (the so-called
‘independence of inclusion from encounter’ rule).
Goss-Custard (1977) found evidence in support of
this prediction in his studies of redshanks, small wading
birds, found in estuarine habitats in Great Britain.
Redshanks feed on crustaceans, which offer higher
energetic returns, and worms, which offer lower
energetic returns. As predicted, the birds did not
indiscriminately consume every worm or crustacean
encountered; instead, they exclusively ate crustaceans
when their density was high, but included worms in the
diet when crustacean density declined. This result
makes intuitive sense because the cost of eating worms
includes missed opportunities to search for and eat
more nutritionally proﬁtable crustaceans. When
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2008) 363, 3825–3835
doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0159
Published online 1 October 2008
One contribution of 10 to a Theme Issue ‘Neuroeconomics’.
*Author and address for correspondence: Center for Cognitive
Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC27708, USA
(karlikiiko@gmail.com).
3825 This journal is q 2008 The Royal Society
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.crustaceans are rare, however, it is more proﬁtable to
focus on small but abundant worms rather than
wasting time searching for higher value foods.
The behaviour of a wide variety of species, including
birds (Davies 1977; Goss-Custard 1977), spiders
(Diaz-Fleischer 2005), ﬁshes (Anderson 1984) and
even humans (Milton 1979; Waddington & Holden
1979; Hawkes et al. 1982), has been found to ﬁt the
general predictions of the prey model. However, as is
often the case in economics, MacArthur and Pianka’s
simple model does not perfectly describe behaviour in
the real world. While the formal mathematical
derivation of the prey model predicts a step-like change
in preference, in which one type of prey is always
preferred to the exclusion of the other (the ‘zero–one
rule’), the birds in Goss-Custard’s study showed
‘partial preferences’ for different types of prey (e.g.
preferring one type 75% of the time) when their density
changed. Such partial preferences might reﬂect
sampling behaviour, which allows the animal to acquire
improved information about the statistics of the local
environment (Krebs et al. 1977). Alternatively, partial
preferences could reﬂect sensory- or memory-related
cognitive limitations that interfere with the expression
of optimal behaviour (Stephens & Krebs 1986).
In addition to selecting between prey items, animals
that forage for foods that are clumped in space and time
must decide how long to spend foraging within a
particular patch before abandoning it and moving onto
another. Charnov’s (1976) marginal value theorem
models a forager’s behaviour given a patchy distribution
of resources. Here the fundamental decision is whether
to spend more time searching for prey in a given patch,
or whether toswitchtoa new patch,which requires both
time and energy. As in the prey model, the patch model
assumes that the forager’s goal is to maximize R,t h e
average rate of energy intake. By deﬁnition, individual
patches in the environment have ﬁnite resources, which
the forager will eventually deplete. Charnov deduced
that an animal foraging in a patchy environment should
leave the patch when the rate of gain from that patch is
equal to the overall rate of gain from the environment as
awhole.Thispredictioniseasilytestedbymeasuringthe
timeelapsed beforethe animal leaves its current patch in
search of a new one, and has been upheld in several
different experimental paradigms with several species
(Cowie 1977; Lima 1983).
Early models, including the patch and prey models,
described behavioural optimization in a generic sense,
without regard to the speciﬁc physiological or cognitive
constraints on a particular animal. Making precise
predictions for individuals of a given species, on the
other hand, requires consideration of the speciﬁc
physiological and environmental constraints on that
animal. For example, elk foraging for terrestrial and
aquatic plants must satisfy both energetic needs and
sodium requirements within the limitations imposed by
gut capacity. Terrestrial plants are richer in energy than
aquatic plants, and take up less room in the gut.
However, aquatic plants contain more sodium than
terrestrial plants, and, because aquatic plants are
buried under ice during the winter, elk must consume
enough of them during the summer to satisfy their
sodium requirements for the rest of the year (Belovsky
1978). According to the model, elk can maximize
energetic returns while simultaneously satisfying
sodium needs and rumen constraints by selecting a
diet comprising 18 per cent aquatic plants and 82 per
cent terrestrial plants—in precise agreement with the
observations of foraging elk in the wild (ﬁgure 1).
Early ﬁeld studies testing optimal foraging models,
such as Goss-Custard’s redshank study and Belovsky’s
elk study, demonstrated the strengths of the economic
approach: formulation of models allows for clear and
precise predictions that can be tested empirically, and
provides a quantitative tool around which to organize
explanations of behaviour. Importantly for this review,
such models make clear that deﬁning rewards and
punishments requires careful consideration of the
behavioural and physiological capacities of a given
species and the speciﬁc physical and social environ-
ments in which they normally act. The same resource
may be pursued as a ‘reward’ in some contexts and
avoided in others.
3. NEUROBIOLOGY OF REWARD AND DECISION
MAKING
Ultimately, the nervous systems of humans and other
animals have evolved to promote behaviours that
enhance ﬁtness, such as acquiring food and shelter,
attracting mates, avoiding predators and prevailing
over competitors. To achieve these goals, animal brains
have become exquisitely specialized to attend to
important features of the environment, extract their
predictive value for success or failure and then use this
information to compute the evolutionarily optimal
course of action. Traditionally, these brain mechanisms
have been studied with regard to their roles in acquiring
rewards and avoiding punishments.
As noted above, rewards are traditionally deﬁned as
stimuli that elicit approach behaviour, while punish-
ments can be deﬁned as stimuli that elicit avoidance.
Recent studies have revealed elementary properties
of the neural systems that process rewards and
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Figure 1. Optimal diet choice in elk (Alces alces). The daily
ratio of aquatic to terrestrial plants consumed by elk must
satisfy three constraints: the diet must meet energetic (blue
line) and sodium requirements (red line), subject to digestive
limitations (green line). Those ratios that meet these
constraints are contained in the yellow-shaded area. The
vertex marked with an asterisk indicates the aquatic-
to-terrestrial plant ratio that maximizes energetic intake while
also satisfying all constraints. Adapted from Stephens & Krebs
(1986). Photo courtesy of the National Park Service.
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circuit connecting midbrain dopamine neurons to the
ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex appears to be
crucial for processing information about rewards
(Schultz 2000; Schultz & Dickinson 2000). For
example, animals will work to receive stimulation
delivered via electrodes implanted in the dopaminergic
ventral tegmental area (VTA), lateral hypothalamus or
medial forebrain bundle, which connects the VTA to
the ventral striatum (Olds & Milner 1954; Carlezon &
Chartoff 2007). In fact, animals will preferentially work
for such intracranial self-stimulation, to the exclusion
of acquiring natural reinforcers such as food or water
(Routtenberg & Lindy 1965; Frank & Stutz 1984).
Electrophysiological recordings from dopaminergic
neurons show that these cells respond to unpredicted
primary rewards, such as food and water, as well as to
conditioned stimuli that predict such rewards (Schultz
2000; Schultz & Dickinson 2000; ﬁgure 2). Moreover,
dopamine neuron responses scale with both reward
magnitude and reward probability (Fiorillo et al.2 0 0 3 ;
Tobler et al.2 0 0 5 ). Dopamine neurons do not, however,
merely signal rewards and the stimuli that predict them.
Current evidence suggests that phasic bursts by
dopamine neurons may correspond to the reward
prediction error term initially proposed in purely
behavioural models of learning (Schultz et al.1 9 9 7 ).
According to this view, such phasic dopamine responses
provide a mechanism for updating predicted valuation
functions, which can be used both to learn about stimuli
in the environment and to select proﬁtable courses of
action (Montague & Berns 2002). These valuation
functions can be thought of as the neural implemen-
tation of the optimization functions assumed to
guide behaviour in economic models developed in
behavioural ecology.
Signals from the dopaminergic midbrain neurons
inﬂuence processing within decision-making areas,
primarily orbital and medial prefrontal cortices, that
assign value to sensory stimuli (Schultz et al. 2000).
Value signals in these areas may inform processing in
areas such as dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal
cortices, which eventually transform that information
into motor output (Gold & Shadlen 2001; Sugrue et al.
2004). For example, Platt & Glimcher (1999) probed
the impact of expected value on sensory–motor
processing in the lateral intraparietal (LIP) area, a
region of the brain previously linked to visual attention
and motor preparation. In that study, monkeys were
cued to shift gaze from a central light to one of two
peripheral lights to receive a fruit juice reward. In
separate blocks of trials, the authors varied the
expected value of orienting to each light by varying
either the size of reward or the probability the monkey
would be cued to shift gaze to each of the lights. Platt
and Glimcher found that LIP neurons signalled target
value, the product of reward size and saccade
likelihood, prior to cue onset (ﬁgure 3). In a second
experiment, monkeys were permitted to choose freely
between the two targets, and both neuronal activity in
the LIP area and the probability of target choice were
correlated with target value.
Sugrue, Corrado and Newsome extended these
observations by probing the dynamics of decision-
related activity in the LIP area using a virtual foraging
task (Sugrue et al. 2004). In that experiment, the
rewards associated with each of two targets ﬂuctuated
over time. Under these conditions, monkeys tended to
match the rate of choosing each target to its relative rate
of reinforcement. Moreover, the responses of individual
LIP neurons to a particular target corresponded to the
relative rate of reward gained from choosing it on recent
trials, with the greatest weight placed on the most recent
trials. Together, these and other studies suggest that
simple behavioural decisions may be computed by
scaling neuronal responses associated with a particular
stimulus or movement by its value, thus modifying the
likelihood of reaching the threshold for eliciting a
speciﬁc motor action (Gold & Shadlen 2001).
4. UNCERTAINTY AND DECISION MAKING
Early ethological models of behaviour assumed that
animals have complete knowledge of the environment
and that reward contingencies are deterministic
(Stephens & Krebs 1986). In practice, however,
uncertainty about environmental contingencies places
strong constraints on behaviour. The impact of
uncertainty on choice has long been acknowledged in
economics, which deﬁnes the spread of an outcome’s
known probability as risk. In the eighteenth century,
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(no R) CS
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Figure 2. Reward-related responses by a single dopamine
neuron recorded in a macaque monkey. (a) When the animal
is still learning the task, the fruit juice reward is unexpected,
and the neuron responds at the time of reward delivery (R)
(no prediction, reward occurs). (b) After the monkey learns
the relationship between a conditioned stimulus (such as a
light or tone) and a reward, the neuron responds to the
conditioned stimulus that predicts reward delivery (CS), but
not to the reward itself (reward predicted, reward occurs).
(c) If the reward is omitted after the predictive stimulus,
dopamine neuron activity is suppressed during the time of
expected reward delivery (reward predicted, no reward
occurs). Each raster indicates the time of neuron spiking,
and each row corresponds to a single trial for that neuron.
The histograms summate the spikes over all the trials.
Adapted from Schultz et al. (1997).
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values of monetary transactions, particularly risky
ﬁnancial ventures, differ from their corresponding
subjective utilities (as determined by the economic
agent). This idea, which would eventually revolutionize
the ﬁeld of economics, challenged the traditional
notion that people value outcomes strictly according
to their ﬁnancial returns.
Initial economic models applied to animal behaviour
explicitly ignored variance in reward outcomes. For
example, Charnov’s (1976) marginal value theorem,
devised to predict when a foraging animal should leave
a particular food patch, is based purely on the average
distribution of resources among locations. Although
this model predicts behaviour in simple contexts fairly
well, it fails to account for behavioural sensitivity to
variability within patches. Yet risk strongly determines
how animals choose among available options (reviewed
in Bateson & Kacelnik 1998), and the impact of risk on
decision making itself can be inﬂuenced by behavioural
context or internal state. For example, Caraco
observed the behaviour of yellow-eyed juncos, a species
of small songbirds native to Mexico and the
southwestern United States (Caraco et al. 1980;
Caraco 1981). The birds were given the option of
choosing a tray with a ﬁxed number of millet seeds or a
tray with a probabilistically varying number of seeds
with the same mean as the ﬁxed option. Surprisingly,
preferences depended on the ambient temperature. At
198C juncos preferred the ﬁxed option, but at 18C they
preferred the variable option. The proposed expla-
nation for this switch from risk aversion to risk seeking
is that, at the higher temperature, the rate of gain from
the ﬁxed option was sufﬁcient to maintain the bird on a
positive energy budget. At the lower temperature,
however, energy expenditures were elevated, so the
ﬁxedoptionwasnolongeradequatetomeettheanimal’s
energy needs. When cold, the bird’s best chance for
survival was to gamble on the risky option since it might
yieldahigherrateofreturnthantheﬁxedoption.Energy
budget has been reported to impact risk taking in a
variety of animal species, including ﬁshes (Young et al.
1990), insects (Cartar & Dill 1990) and mammals
(Barnard et al. 1983; Ito et al. 2000), although the
ubiquity of this relationship has been questioned
(Kacelnik & Bateson 1996). This principle also appears
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Figure 3. LIP neurons encode visual target value. (a) Neuronal ﬁring is greater during trials when the expected reward is large
(black line) than when it is small (grey line). Black and grey rasters indicate the time of individual spikes for large and small
reward trials, respectively; each line of rasters corresponds to a single trial. Curves represent the summation of activity over all
the trials. (b) Firing rate of a single LIP neuron increases linearly with (i) reward size and (ii) reward probability. Adapted
from Platt & Glimcher (1999).
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money(Pietras etal. 2003) or opiates (Bickeletal. 2004)
as a reward. These observations strongly suggest that
sensitivity to risk is a widespread neural adaptation that
evolved to support decision making.
Recent neurobiological studies have explored these
neural mechanisms in both human and non-human
primates (Glimcher 2003; Sanfey et al. 2006). In
humans, preference for a risky option is associated
with increases in neuronal activity in the ventral
striatum and posterior parietal cortex (Huettel et al.
2006). Moreover, choosing a risky option activates the
dorsal striatum, precuneus and premotor cortex (Hsu
et al. 2005). A recent electrophysiological study in
monkeys probed how such risk-related activity might
inform action (McCoy & Platt 2005). Monkeys were
given a choice between juice rewards ofﬁxed or variable
sizes with the same mean reward rate. Under these
conditions, monkeys showed a strong preference for
the risky option. Simultaneous recordings from single
neurons in the posterior cingulate cortex, a region of
the brain associated with spatial attention, visual
orienting and reward processing, revealed that ﬁring
rates were correlated with subjective preferences for the
risky option. Furthermore, spatial sensitivity of
neurons in posterior cingulate was enhanced in riskier
contexts. Such risk-induced changes in response gain
may enhance the expression of strong behavioural
preferences. The foregoing discussion makes plain that
the discrepancy between observable outcomes and
subjective preferences in decision making under risk
offers a powerful paradigm for investigating the neural
mechanisms underlying adaptive decision making.
5. NEURAL SYSTEMS MEDIATING EXPLORATION
AND EXPLOITATION
As formalized in Charnov’s marginal value theorem,
d e s c r i b e da b o v e ,a na n i m a lf o r a g i n gi na ne n v i r o n -
ment with a heterogeneous distribution of resources
must, at some point, choose to leave the current food
patch to search for an alternative, potentially more
rewarding patch. The locus coeruleus (LC), a
collection of noradrenergic cells located in the pons,
may mediate the shift from resource exploitation to
exploration (Aston-Jones et al. 1999; Aston-Jones &
Cohen 2005). These cells receive strong projections
from the anterior cingulate (ACC) and orbitofrontal
cortices (OFC), which may carry information about
the current behavioural context and recent reward
history (Aston-Jones & Cohen 2005). LC nor-
adrenergic neurons, in turn, project diffusely through-
out the brain. These projections appear to adjust the
responsiveness of target structures to synaptic inputs
(Foote et al. 1983; Aston-Jones et al.1 9 9 9 ).
Recordings from monkeys indicate that LC neurons
have moderate baseline activity punctuated by
marked phasic responses linked to task-related cues
and motor outputs. This pattern of activity is evident
only when the animal is well engaged in the task at
hand. When the animal is unfocused and distractible,
however, as indicated by an increase in errors and
failed trials, LC neurons switch from ﬁring in the
phasic mode to a tonic high level ofﬁring. At the other
extreme, when the monkey is sleepy and inattentive,
LC neurons ﬁre at low tonic rates with an absence of
phasic bursts (Aston-Jones & Cohen 2005; ﬁgure 4).
Together, these qualities suggest that LC neurons
might generate signals that trigger shifts in behavioural
strategy. Decreasing marginal utility may be commu-
nicated to the LC by the ACC and the OFC, which may
shift the LC between the phasic and tonic modes of
activity (Aston-Jones et al. 1999; Aston-Jones & Cohen
2005). In one mode, phasic LC neuron ﬁring is task
related, and the animal persists its behaviour, presum-
ablybecausetherewardingaspectsof thetaskaregreater
than the associated cognitive and physiological
demands. In the alternative mode, however, an increase
in baseline ﬁring reﬂects diminished utility derived from
performing the task. This, in turn, frees up cognitive
resources to switch to other,potentially morerewarding,
behaviours. This interpretation implies that the
depletion of resources in a particular resource patch
may be encoded by the ﬁring rates of neurons in the
ACC and the OFC. Consistent with this idea, the ACC
and the OFC are active during reversal learning tasks
that require the subject to abandon a previously
rewarded strategy following a shift in stimulus–reward
mapping (Meunier et al. 1997; Shima & Tanji 1998;
O’Doherty et al. 2001; Kringelbach & Rolls 2003;
Hornak et al. 2004). Such signals may serve to trigger
shifts in LC activation state, thus increasing the
likelihood that the animal will leave the current patch
to search for a new one.
6. SOCIAL REWARDS IN PRIMATES
In most neurobiological studies of decision making in
non-human animals, food or water is delivered for
performing a particular action. Such direct and
immediate reinforcers are typically referred to as
primary rewards, and, as reviewed above, are associated
with the activation of midbrain dopamine neurons,
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Figure 4. Neurons in the LC reﬂect the level of task
engagement. A sleepy, uninterested monkey has a low level
of baseline ﬁring and no task-related phasic response in the
LC (left). A monkey that is engaged in the task has low
baseline ﬁring paired with a phasic response that is linked to
the motor actions performed in compliance with task
demands (centre). An unfocused, distractible monkey has
an attenuated phasic response coupled with high baseline
ﬁring (right). This mode of LC responsiveness may signal
to the monkey that it is time to switch tasks. Arrowheads
signify the onset of target stimuli. Adapted from Aston-Jones
et al. (1999).
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among other areas. In humans, a varied assortment of
hedonically positive experiences can evoke activity in
these regions, including eating chocolate, hearing
pleasant music or even reading a funny cartoon (Blood
& Zatorre 2001; Small et al. 2001; Mobbs et al.2 0 0 3 ;
Watson et al.2 0 0 7 ).
Although outcomes such as food consumption or
the opportunity to mate clearly motivate behaviour,
abstract goals such as information gathering or social
interaction can also motivate approach or orienting
behaviour in the absence of hedonic experience. For
primates, in particular, many decisions are motivated
by competitive and cooperative interactions with others
in a social group (Ghazanfar & Santos 2004). Given the
adaptive signiﬁcance of navigating a complex social
environment, one might predict that social stimuli and
interactions would evoke activity in neural circuits that
overlap with those activated by primary rewards.
Indeed, this pattern of activation has been observed
in several functional imaging studies. For example,
human participants in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game
show activity in all of the familiar reward-related
regions when they engage in bouts of cooperative
behaviour with their playing partners: OFC; nucleus
accumbens; caudate; and ACC (Rilling et al. 2002).
The caudate nucleus is also activated when people
punish defectors in order to promote cooperation (the
so-called ‘altruistic punishment’), even when doing so
imposes a personal cost (de Quervain et al. 2004).
In many circumstances, images offaces act as potent
primary reinforcers and induce neural activity in
structures associated with reward processing. For
example, the sight of an attractive smiling face activates
the medial OFC and the nucleus accumbens (Aharon
et al. 2001; O’Doherty et al. 2003; Ishai 2007). In a
classical conditioning experiment, Bray & O’Doherty
(2007) demonstrated that an arbitrary visual stimulus
acquires value when paired with an attractive face,
just as it would when paired with a direct reinforcer
such as food. Furthermore, their research conﬁrmed
that the neural processes that link the conditioned
stimulus with the reward are independent of reward
type (e.g. fruit juice, money or an attractive face). Faces
may be intrinsically valuable to humans because they
direct attention to features of the environment
that present information relevant to survival and
reproduction. For example, physical features of the
face provide information about genetic quality or
fertility and thus can be useful in determining whether
or not to pursue mating (Jones et al. 2001; Soler
et al.2 0 0 3 ; Roberts et al.2 0 0 4 ). In addition to
attractiveness, people also use information from faces
to assess trustworthiness (Winston et al. 2002) and the
expected value of cooperation (Singer et al. 2004).
Together, these observations implicate the operation
of a neural system dedicated to linking social stimuli
such as faces to the valuation functions guiding
behavioural decision making.
Non-human primates also use social information to
evaluate their behavioural options. One particularly
well-studied aspect of this phenomenon is the use of
visual cues to predict the receptivity (Hrdy & Whitten
1987; Waitt etal.20 03 ) orquality(Domb& Pagel2001)
of a potential mate. For example, variations in skin
coloration occur in response to hormone levels in both
male and female rhesus macaques (Rhodes et al.1 9 9 7 ).
Femalerhesusmacaques prefer red malefacesover faces
with less pigmentation, suggesting that mate choice in
thisspeciesmaybeinﬂuencedbyskincolour(Waittetal.
2003). The reddening of the female rhesus macaque
perineum that occurs during oestrus is analogous to the
prominent swellings that occur in female chimpanzees
and baboons (Dixson 1983; Nunn 1999), providing a
potential signal of receptivity and fertility.
Whereas the absence of any obvious analogous
signals in human females has led some to suggest that
ovulation in our species is a cryptic process, differences
in body odour (Singh & Bronstad 2001; Havlicek et al.
2006), social behaviour (Matteo & Rissman 1984;
Harvey 1987; Haselton et al. 2007) and skin coloration
(Vandenberghe & Frost 1986) do occur in human
females during periods of high fertility. Facial sym-
metry, a characteristic that both rhesus monkeys and
humans ﬁnd appealing in conspeciﬁcs (Rhodes 2006;
Waitt & Little 2006), increases in female humans
during ovulation (Manning et al. 1996). Moreover,
such differences are detectable; men ﬁnd the faces of
ovulating women more attractive than those of non-
ovulating women (Roberts et al. 2004) and pay higher
tips for lap dances performed by ovulating women than
by menstruating women (Miller et al. 2007). Such
observations suggest that mate choice in human and
non-human primates alike are inﬂuenced by ovulatory
status via physical and behavioural cues.
Attentiveness to social cues in non-human primates
is not limited to the case of mate choice. Studies of
primate social behaviour have revealed that monkeys
preferentially invest in relationships with dominant
individuals (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990; Maestripieri
2007) and are exquisitely sensitive to dominance cues,
such as eye contact (Van Hoof 1967). These obser-
vations suggest that primate brains compute value
functions for speciﬁc social and reproductive stimuli
that guide behaviour. Deaner et al. (2005) explored this
hypothesis quantitatively in the laboratory using a pay-
per-view task in which male rhesus macaques were
given a choice between two targets. Orienting to one
target yielded fruit juice but to the other yielded fruit
juice and the picture of a familiar monkey. By
systematically changing the juice pay-offs for each
target and the pools of images revealed, the authors
estimated the value of different types of social and
reproductive stimuli in a liquid currency.
Their work revealed that male monkeys forego larger
juice rewards to view female sexual signals or the faces
of high-ranking males, but need overpayment to view
the faces of low-ranking males (ﬁgure 5). In contrast to
the valuation functions governing target choice, the
patterns of gaze associated with each class of image hint
at the affective complexity associated with social
stimuli. Speciﬁcally, monkeys looked at female sexual
signals for longer than they looked at either high- or
low-ranking male faces, perhaps reﬂecting differences
in the hedonic qualities of these stimuli (ﬁgure 5).
Several recent studies suggest that some of the same
brain areas that mediate valuation of non-social stimuli
contribute to valuation of social stimuli as well. For
3830 K. K. Watson & M. L. Platt Review. Neuroethology of reward and decision making
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2008)example, a recent study by Rudebeck et al. (2006)
showed that the ACC is necessary for normal approach
and avoidance responses to social stimuli (Rudebeck
et al. 2006). They measured the latency of macaque
monkeys to retrieve a piece of food in the presence of
fear inducing stimuli (a rubber snake) or social stimuli
(video of other macaques). Unlesioned animals and
those with OFC lesions showed normal orienting to the
social stimuli, but monkeys with ACC lesions
completely ignored them. This result is consistent
with the observation that animals with ACC lesions
spend less time in the proximity of conspeciﬁcs
(Hadland et al. 2003). Together, these observations
indicate that ACC lesions blunt the reinforcing aspects
of social interaction.
The observation that monkeys with ACC lesions
show reduced orienting to highly salient social stimuli
implies that brain areas involved in the control of
attention and eye movements, such as parietal cortex,
normally receive information about the value of social
stimuli from brain areas such as the ACC. This
hypothesis was recently tested in a study by Klein
et al. (2008) who probed the activity of neurons in the
LIP area in monkeys performing the pay-per-view task
described previously. In this experiment, the target
associated with visual outcomes, such as the display of
the face of a dominant male or the perineum of a
female, was always positioned within the response ﬁeld
of the neuron under study. Klein and colleagues found
that LIP neurons responded most strongly when
monkeys chose to view images of female sexual signals,
less strongly when they chose to view images of the
faces of dominant males, and least of all on the rare
occasions when they chose to view the faces of
subordinate males (ﬁgure 5c). These data demonstrate
that LIP neurons signal, among other variables, the
value of social stimuli in the visual scene. Together,
these results endorse the idea that the primate brain
is organized, in part, to adaptively acquire valuable
social information.
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Figure 5. Monkeys value visual signals of status and sex, and parietal cortex signals the value of these images in the visual scene.
(a) Example images shown to monkeys during a ‘pay-per-view’ task used to assess valuation of socially relevant visual images:
(i) female perinea, (ii) monkey faces (high- and low-ranking individuals) and (iii) grey square. (b) Mean normalized (i) orienting
values and (ii) looking times for various image classes. Orienting values are signiﬁcantly higher for both the perinea (red bar) and
high-status faces (blue bar) in contrast to either the low-status faces (green bar) or grey square (grey bar). Although the monkeys
choose to orient more frequently to the high- than low-status faces, the length of time they gaze at either of these image classes
are both shorter than the time they spend viewing the perinea. Adapted from Deaner et al. (2005).( c) Peristimulus time
histogram of 34 LIP neurons recorded during the ‘pay-per-view’ task. Note that the activity associated with high-value images,
such as female perinea and dominant faces, is consistently greater than that associated with low-value subordinate face images.
Adapted from Klein et al. (2008). Red line, hindquarters; blue line, dominant; grey line, grey; green line, subordinate.
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One of the results of the dialogue between biology and
economics was the development of evolutionary game
theory (Maynard Smith & Price 1973; Smith 1982). As
a conceptual framework, game theory can be used to
describe the ways in which behaviour is inﬂuenced by
the behaviour of other animals when competing for
limited resources such as mates and food. A classical
game describes the interaction of two or more agents
with conﬂicting interests, both trying to maximize some
gain. Each game makes precise the number of agents
involved, the actions available to those agents and the
pay-off that will result from all possible interactions. In
economics, the participants in the game identify the
costs and beneﬁts available to each player, and are
generally expected to adopt a ‘rational’ behavioural
strategy. Typically, these behavioural strategies com-
prise a probabilistic distribution of responses for all
players, often called the Nash equilibrium, invulnerable
to penetration by other behavioural strategies. In the
biological applications of game theory, the economic
assumptions of self-interest and rationality are replaced
by the evolutionary assumptions of Darwinian ﬁtness
and population stability.
In the ﬁrst direct application of behavioural game
theory to neurophysiology, Barraclough et al. (2004)
studied frequency-dependent decision making in
monkeys while recording from neurons in dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Monkeys played an
analogue of matching pennies against a computer
opponent. In this game, the animal is rewarded for
choosing the target not chosen by the computer. By
manipulating the algorithm governing the computer’s
choices, the experimenters were able to simulate social
opponents implementing various strategies. When
confronted with an opponent that tracked both the
history of choices and rewards received, monkeys’
choice frequencies approached the optimal random
solution. Neurons in the DLPFC were sensitive to the
animal’s choice history, the computer’s choice history
and the value of the rewards on the most recent trials.
These signals could in theory be used to update the
values of each alternative action, a computation
necessary for the animal to choose optimally. This
interpretation is consistent with other observations
indicating that DLPFC neuron ﬁring reﬂects the
accumulation of sensory evidence during a difﬁcult
perceptual discrimination task, as well as the animal’s
eventual choice (Kim & Shadlen 1999). Functional
imaging studies also assign a role for both DLPFC and
posterior parietal cortex in decision making in
uncertain contexts, particularly as the subject reaches
a decision (Huettel et al. 2005). These studies imply
that DLPFC plays a crucial role in decision making by
acting as a comparator of alternative options and then
linking the favourable option to the behavioural output.
By contrast, neurons in the dorsal ACC were less
likely to encode the actual choice than those in the
DLPFC in monkeys playing matching pennies (Seo &
Lee 2007). Instead, neurons in the ACC were strongly
modulated by rewards received in previous trials (Lee
et al. 2007). The ability to make strategic behavioural
changes in dynamic environments seems likely to
require the coordinated interaction of several frontal
areas, including the DLPFC, which represents
environmental states and the associated behavioural
output, the ACC, which represents the outcome of a
particular action, and the OFC, which assigns values to
particular objects in the environment (Lee et al. 2007).
8. CONCLUSION
Although still in the early stages, the union of ethology,
economics, psychology and neuroscience—the emer-
ging ﬁeld of neuroeconomics—offers a potentially
powerful way to study the neural mechanisms under-
lying decision making and behavioural allocation. Just
as in other animals, natural selection has shaped human
behaviour and its neural substrate. Thus, the behaviour
we display today may more strongly reﬂect the
operation of a nervous system that evolved over aeons
to optimize hunting and gathering behaviour in small
groups rather than to be economically rational
(Cosmides & Tooby 1994). These considerations
predict that neuroethological studies will be crucial
for understanding the neurobiology of reward and
decision making in humans as well as other animals.
The authors would like to thank Stephen Shepherd and Jeff
Klein for their helpful comments on the manuscript.
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